Introduction
Two solution concepts are dominant in game theory: the Nash equilibrium set (NEset) and the core. The importance of the first concept was recognized immediately, the history of the core is more complex. It turns out that there are remarkable similarities if one looks at the role of the NE-set in non-cooperative game theory and the role of the core in cooperative game theory. Non-cooperative games without Nash equilibria as well as cooperative games with an empty core are not very attractive for a game theorist and also not in practice. In such cases one can still hope for the existence of approximate Nash equilibria or approximate core elements. In case of a determined non-cooperative game an agreement of the players on some NE gives a certain stability because in a play none of the players can profit in unilaterally deviating from the agreed equilibrium.
Similarly, if in a game a core element is proposed no subgroup of players can perform better in splitting off. In case the NE-set is large or the core is large there is room for a selection theory or a refinement theory. To finish with the similarities, for both solution concepts, there are axiomatizations using consistency and converse consistency.
In this paper we concentrate on balanced cooperative games, which are games with a non-empty core [4] , and introduce for such games a new core selection, the AL-value.
Just as in the definition of the well-known Shapley value [8] an averaging of n! vectors takes place which correspond to the n! possible orders of the players in an n-person game. For the Shapley value the vectors are the marginal vectors of the game, for the AL-value the vectors are the lexicographical optimal points in the core.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2 I introduce the AL-value, discuss some interesting properties and treat some examples. It turns out that on the cone of convex games [9] the AL-value and the Shapley value coincide. Section 3 deals with exact games and the exactification operator on games. The AL-value is an additive function on the cone of exact games. Characteristic for the AL-value is the INVEXproperty (the invariance w.r.t. exactification). Further, for simplex games [1, 11] and also for dual simplex games or 1-convex games [1, 3] it is shown that the AL-value of such a game coincides with the Shapley value of the exactification of the game. In section 4 the AL-value is studied for the cone of big boss games [5] and it coincides there with the τ -value [10] and the nucleolus [6] . In section 5 the exactification operator is adapted to treat a family of partially defined games, which gives a possibility to define for such games also the AL-value and other values. Section 6 indicates topics for further research.
Given a balanced n-person < N, v > and given an ordering σ = (σ(1), σ (2), . . . , σ(n)) of the players in N, the lexicographic maximum of the core C(v) with respect to σ is denoted by S σ (v). It is the unique point of the core C(v) with the properties:
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is an extreme point of the core for each σ.
The average lexicographic value of < N, v > is the average over all S
, where Π(N) denotes the set of n! orderings of N.
Example 2.1. Let < N, v > be a 2-person balanced game with N = {1, 2}. Then
2 )
the standard solution for the 2-person game < N, v > . 
So, AL(v) = (10, 10, 10) =
, the reverse order of σ, and φ(v) is the Shapley value of < N, v > .
Proof. Note that for each σ ∈ Π(N ) :
Theorem 2.4. Let < N, v > be a balanced simplex game [1, 11] i.e. a game where C(v)
is equal to the non-empty imputation set
, the center of the imputation set.
Proof. Note that I(v) = conv{f
For dual simplex games (also called 1-convex games) (see [3] , [11] ) we give without proof the following results.
Theorem 2.5. Let < N, v > be a balanced n-person game with
where
Then AL(v) = ENSR(v), where EN SR is the rule which splits equally the nonseparable rewards. AL(v) is also equal to the nucleolus [6] and the τ -value [10] of (N, v).
It will be clear that AL satisfies the following properties: IR (Individual rationality), EFF (efficiency), S-equivalence, CS (core selection) and SYM (symmetry). Also DUM (the dummy property) holds for AL because for each balanced game < N, v > the AL-value AL(v) is an element of the core and for each x ∈ C(v) :
So, if i is a dummy player, then 
Exact games
Exact games are introduced by Schmeidler [7] and they play an interesting role in this section. Recall that a game is an exact game if for each coalition S ∈ 2 Proof of (ii) only. Let < N, v > be a simplex game. Then C(v) = 
Note that < N, v > is not convex because
Note further that Ext(C(v)) has the maximum number of 24 extreme points:
(i) 12 extreme points which are permutations of (10,5,5,2),
(ii) 9 extreme points which are permutations of (7,7,8,0) but with first coordinate unequal to 0,
From this follows that < N, v > is an exact game, and that each lexicographic maximum 
Big boss games and the average lexicographic value
Big boss games are introduced in [5] and further discussed in [1] and [11] . Recall that an n-person game < N, v > is a big boss game with n as big boss if the following three conditions hold:
1. Big boss property: v(S) = 0 for all S with n / ∈ S.
Monotonicity property: v(S)
with S ⊂ T.
Union property
with n ∈ S.
(v), . . . ,
The extreme points of a big boss game < N, v > with n as big boss are of the form
where T ⊂ N\{n} and
, where T (σ) = {i ∈ N \{n}|σ(i) < σ(n)}.
Theorem 4.1. Let < N, v > be a big boss game with n as big boss. Then AL(v) = τ (v).
By EFF of τ and AL then also AL
Let us look at the exactification < N, v E > of the big boss game < N, v > with n as a big boss.
(ii) For S with n ∈ S we have
Cases where a player set N is confronted with the problem of dividing v(N ), where not for each subcoalition of N the worth is given, are discussed extensively in the literature.
I will consider special balanced partially defined games. These are games < N, v, F >,
where N is the player set, F is a subset of 2 It is interesting to study AL in such situations.
Concluding remarks
Further research on the average lexicographic value will include (i) monotonicity properties of AL,
(ii) continuity properties of AL, 
